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• Transparency is now considered an essential
element of an effective monetary policy
framework, and a central bank’s
communication strategy is key to achieving
this. Consequently, central banks
continuously strive to improve how they
communicate to ﬁnancial markets and the
broader public.
• In an effort to increase transparency, the Bank
of Canada and other central banks have begun
to use forward-looking policy guidance in
their communications. The Bank of Canada
now includes forward-looking statements in
press releases accompanying interest rate
decisions and in monetary policy reports.
• Thereiscurrentlyadebateovertheusefulness
of forward-looking statements. The empirical
evidence in this article suggests that, to date,
the use of forward-looking statements in Bank
of Canada communications has made the
Bank more predictable, but not necessarily
more transparent.
isclosing more of the Bank's assessment about
the outlook, including forward-looking state-
ments about monetary policy actions, is particu-
larly tricky and really tests the limits of
transparency. Nevertheless, it is in this area that there may
be the most room to increase transparency. But ﬁrst, we
must ﬁgure out if it would be beneﬁcial to provide more
information for market participants, ﬁrms, and individuals.
More fundamentally, would it improve the effectiveness of
monetary policy? And if we ﬁnd that it would be beneﬁcial,
how can we convey this information so that it would be
readily understood? Or more importantly, how can we con-
vey this information in a way that will not be misunder-
stood? (Kennedy 2008)
It is generally accepted today that transparency is a
key component of an effective monetary policy frame-
work, and communication plays an important role in
increasing transparency. Over the past few years,
several major central banks have sought to further
enhance their monetary policy transparency by includ-
ing guidance on the policy rate in their ofﬁcial com-
munications in the form of either policy-inclination
statements (also known as forward-looking state-
ments) or a policy-rate path or forecast. There is an
ongoing debate, however, on the value of communi-
cating policy-rate guidance to the public, including
strong arguments for and against its use. In this article,
we examine the debate from both a theoretical and an
empirical standpoint.1 Our empirical analysis suggests
1.  This article is based on a forthcoming working paper by the authors (Fay
and Gravelle 2009).
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that forward-looking policy statements in Bank of
Canada communications have made the Bank more
predictable, but have not necessarily helped market
participantsimprove their understanding of the central
bank’s monetary policy reaction function.
Transparency, Predictability, and
Conditionality
Central bank transparency can make monetary policy
more effective in three ways. First, the central bank
fosters greater credibility by being clear about its
objective, including how it is to be attained and the
bank’s ability and commitment to achieve it. Second,
transparency imposes some degree of accountability
through regular exposure to the central bank’s views
and its understanding of current and future economic
activity. This exposure permits the public to assess the
consistency of the central bank’s actions (and its mon-
etary policy decision-making process) with the bank’s
stated objective. Third, and this is the focus of this arti-
cle, central bank transparency should help market
participants improve their understanding of the cen-
tral bank’s monetary policy reaction function, allow-
ing them to better anticipate future changes in the
policy interest rate. Thus, although the central bank
only has control over the short-term (overnight or pol-
icy) interest rate, since short-term and long-term rates
are linked via the expectations hypothesis, the bank
can use its communications to better inﬂuence long-
term rates by enhancing the market's understanding
of the reaction function and its views on the economic
outlook. This communication would increase the
effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism, the process by which expected changes in
monetary policy are incorporated into the movement
of other ﬁnancial variables and, eventually, invest-
ment and consumption decisions, which in turn affect
inﬂation.
The Bank of Canada, like many other central banks,
has taken various measures over the years to increase
transparency and to communicate its views about the
economic outlook to the public. Since 1995, the Bank
has published a Monetary Policy Report (MPR) in April
and October. Beginning in 2000, this has been supple-
mented by a Monetary Policy Report (MPR) Update,
released in January and July.2 Since 1994, a press
release has also been published with every decision on
2. Although the MPR Update is shorter than the MPR, we make no distinction
between the two publications in the remainder of the text.
the policy rate. Over the years, speeches by the Gov-
erning Council (the Governor and the Deputy Gover-
nors) have provided an opportunity to impart
monetary policy information to the public. Finally, in
December 2000, the Bank moved to a system of eight
“ﬁxed announcement dates” (FADs) per year, thereby
reducing the timing uncertainty of its policy decisions.
The Bank of Canada has taken various
measures over the years to increase
transparency and to communicate its
views about the economic outlook
to the public.
Recently, in line with the trend among other central
banks, the Bank began to include forward-looking
statements, a form of policy-rate guidance, in the FAD
press releases and MPRs.3 Rudebusch (2008) identiﬁes
three types of forward-looking policy guidance used
by central banks. The ﬁrst, “indirect signals,” provides
implicit information about the policy path through the
use of related information, such as a balance-of-risk
statement, or the presentation of a risk scenario show-
ing the extent to which inﬂation would deviate from
the inﬂation target, holding policy rates constant. The
second, “direct qualitative” signals, includes the pol-
icy “bias” statements that the U.S. Federal Reserve
(the Fed) used for a short period beginning in the late
1990s. This type of signal can also include phrases that
signal the desired policy stance over an extended
number of monetary policy meetings, such as those
used by the Fed between 2003 and 2006 indicating that
accommodation “can be maintained for a considerable
period” or “can be removed at a pace that is likely to be
measured.” The ﬁnal category, “direct quantitative”
signals, best describes the explicit numerical projec-
tions for the policy interest rate that the central banks
of New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Iceland have provided.
Based on these deﬁnitions, the Bank of Canada has
provided direct qualitative signals to markets via the
forward-looking statements that have been included
3. At the Bank of Canada, forward-looking statements have been designed to
be conditional statements. That is, any statement regarding the future stance
of monetary policy is based on the current state of the economy and may
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in nearly all FAD and MPR press releases since July
2004. These statements typically begin with the phrase
“In line with the projection” and have included word-
ing such as “some increase in the target for the over-
night rate may be required in the near (medium)
term,” “the current level of the target for the overnight
rate is consistent with achieving the inﬂation target
over the near (medium) term,” or “further reduction
of monetary stimulus will be required . . . over the
next four to six quarters.” Recently, the Bank has also
introduced balance-of-risk statements that could be
categorized as indirect guidance. In addition, the Bank
has provided both indirect and direct qualitative guid-
ance in its MPRs and in speeches.
How Much Information?
Currently, there is a debate around how much infor-
mation central banks should release to the public with
respect to their future intentions for the policy rate.4
A potential advantage identiﬁed by Kahn (2007) and
others is that guidance on the policy rate could make
monetary policy more effective by better inﬂuencing
medium- and long-term rates, since these are more
likely to react to policy actions that are accompanied
by communication about the path of future policy
rates.5 Another possible advantage of providing
guidance is that it makes the central bank’s future
decisions on the policy rate more foreseeable or,
equivalently, it may reduce the degree of market
uncertainty related to future monetary policy actions.
This, in turn, should reduce interest rate risk premi-
ums and thus beneﬁt economic agents by reducing the
overall cost of capital.
Kohn (2005), Issing (2005), and others have high-
lighted some notable disadvantages to providing
guidance. First, markets might, paradoxically, place
too great a weight on the guidance on the policy rate
and thus not fully understand or appreciate the condi-
tionality of this guidance. To be clear, markets do not
necessarily perceive the guidance as being fully
unconditional but as less conditional, by some
amount, than intended by the central bank. Conse-
quently, markets may focus less on their own or other
relevant information in formulating their expectations
of future decisions on the policy rate (i.e., the market
does not do its “homework”), which may reduce the
information content of market prices.
4.  See Kahn (2007) for a summary, as well as Moessner and Nelson (2008).
5. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been directly tested empirically.
A second disadvantage related to any perceived un-
conditionality of the guidance on the policy rate is that
it might cause policy-makers to be less willing to
change their policy intentions in light of new informa-
tion, for two reasons. First, frequent updating of the
policy path might undermine the public’s conﬁdence
in the central bank’s forecasting ability. Second, pol-
icy-makers may be concerned that ﬁnancial markets
will overreact to a shift in policy stance or guidance,
leading to excess volatility, even though the change in
circumstance justiﬁes the central bank’s reassessment
of the appropriate policy action.
Greater central bank predictability
will not necessarily imply greater
monetary policy transparency, but
greater transparency does, in general,
imply greater predictability.
On the issue of central banks providing policy guid-
ance in their ofﬁcial communications, it is important
to note that there is a subtle difference between a com-
munication strategy that is “transparent” and one that
is “predictable” (Moessner, Gravelle, and Sinclair
2005; Jen 2007).6 Conceptually, with a more predicta-
ble central bank, market participants can more easily
anticipate the next policy decision (or set of policy
decisions) without necessarily better understanding
the reasons for them. A more transparent central bank,
however, is one that effectively conveys to the market
its monetary policy reaction function, which allows
markets to better anticipate the central bank’s deci-
sions based on a clearer understanding of the factors
at play. Although policy-makers may provide policy
guidance to enhance the markets’ understanding of
the reaction function and, ultimately, the effectiveness
of monetary policy, market participants’ focus on the
guidance could reduce their incentives to update their
understandingofthemonetarypolicyreactionfunction
and to collect and analyze new information. Moreover,
if the central bank’s policy decisions made following
6. Blinder et al. (2008) make the distinction between short-term predictability
(i.e., the markets’ ability to anticipate correctly the next monetary policy deci-
sion) and long-term predictability (i.e., how central bank communications
help to anchor inﬂation expectations). Long-term predictability is related to
the ﬁrst motivation for enhancing transparency discussed in the text: enhanc-
ing the central bank’s credibility.28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2008–2009
Nonetheless, in general, it would seem that central
banks that provide direct qualitative or quantitative
guidance by providing a forward-looking statement
or a policy-rate path have more “work” to do to pro-
mote understanding of the conditionality embedded
in their communications.
In sum, the relevant factors for measuring central
bank predictability are: i) the extent to which the cen-
tral bank conveys the timing and direction of future
rate changes, and ii) the degree of conditionality that
is explicitly embedded in, or more importantly,
implicitly perceived by the market, in its communica-
tions. As highlighted by Kahn (2007, p. 40), central
banks that restrict themselves to use only “balance-of-
risk” statements leave “the markets to interpret any
possible implication of these risks for (future) policy
rates.” In contrast, policy statements like the forward-
looking statements used by the Bank of Canada or the
guidance provided by the Fed may be perceived by
market participants as more unconditional.
Central banks that are increasingly
predictable without being more
transparent should see a decrease in
the reliance of financial markets on
macroeconomic news to anticipate
near-term monetary policy changes.
Empirically, central banks that are increasingly pre-
dictable without being more transparent should see a
decrease in the reliance of ﬁnancial markets on macro-
economic news to anticipate near-term monetary pol-
icy changes.9 In the section below, we investigate
whether the inclusion of forward-looking statements
in Bank of Canada communications has in fact caused
markets to react less to macroeconomic releases
because they view the Bank’s communication as less
conditional, which could be an indication that the
Bank has become more predictable, but not necessar-
ily more transparent.
9.  Put another way, for central banks that are successfully more transparent,
one should observe both an enhanced ability of the market to anticipate the
central bank’s move, measured in most cases by a reduction in the surprise
component of monetary policy decisions (see Poole and Rasche 2003, for
example), and either no reduction of, or a rise in, the sensitivity of market
interest rates in response to macroeconomic news.
the published guidance consistently corroborate the
published guidance, this will also reduce market par-
ticipants’ incentives and will push the market to view
the guidance as less conditional (via learned behav-
iour). As a result, the markets’ reaction to macroeco-
nomic news could decrease.7 Therefore, greater
central bank predictability will not necessarily imply
greater monetary policy transparency, but greater
transparency (i.e. communication of information that
effectively enhances the markets’ understanding of
the reaction function) does, in general, imply greater
predictability.8
It is not clear whether the central banks that publish
their target-rate paths or some other form of guidance
on the policy rate are necessarily “predictable,” since
predictability depends on the degree of perceived con-
ditionality (or the lack thereof) embedded in the cen-
tral bank’s guidance. It is possible that central banks
that provide direct quantitative guidance (i.e., a
policy-rate path) could be less predictable (and more
transparent) than those that offer direct qualitative
guidance, if the forward-looking statement is explic-
itly presented to be, or is implicitly perceived to be,
more unconditional than the policypath. For example,
central banks could indicate that the path is simply
the mean or mode of a probability distribution, with
conﬁdence bands indicating the level and balance of
the risks. Moreover, central banks that publish a path
for the target rate could use it as a tool to animate their
communication about their views of the economic
outlook, and in particular how the risks to this out-
look may manifest themselves, by also providing in-
depth alternative scenarios and/or risks to their base-
case projections for the policy rate.
Moessner and Nelson (2008) argue that the regular
appearance of a policy-rate path in central bank com-
munications may in itself make these communications
more conditional relative to those central banks that
irregularly communicate guidance in the form of direct
qualitative signals, because the latter may be viewed
as doing so for the tactical reason of “massaging” mar-
ket expectations. The latter central banks’ communica-
tion guidance may thus look more unconditional.
7.  Several researchers have termed this behaviour “rational inattention,”
which Sims (2003) deﬁnes as economic agents, or in this case, market partici-
pants optimally choosing what information to focus on, given that individu-
als have a limited capacity for processing information.
8.  Many papers that examine central bank transparency study all or multi-
ple dimensions of this concept. This article, however, focuses on only one
aspect of transparency, and therefore uses a narrower deﬁnition than
that employed  in other work.29 BANK OFCANADAREVIEW • WINTER 2008–2009
Empirical Evidence
In our empirical work, we test whether the use of for-
ward-looking statements has reduced perceived con-
ditionality, thus making the central bank more
predictable, but not necessarily more transparent. This
would show up in two ways. First, markets would
focus less on the information that surrounds the
Bank’s outlook. In this case, we should see longer-
term market rates moving less on FADs. Second, mar-
kets would react less to macroeconomic news
announcements.
We examine these issues in three ways. First, using
daily data, we measure the reaction of market rates to
Bank of Canada communications from 30 October
2000 to 31 May 2007, following the adoption of the
FADs.10 We then split our sample in two at 22 July
2004, the date at which the Bank began to consistently
use forward-looking statements, to see if there is any
change in the markets’ reaction to these communica-
tions and, separately, to macroeconomic news
announcements. Next, to control for FADs that
included a forward-looking statement prior to our
sample break, we measure the reaction of market rates
to the FAD press release on dates where the FAD con-
tained a forward-looking statement against those that
did not.
Methodology and Results
Several issues arise when trying to measure the mar-
kets’ reaction to central bank communications.11 First,
not being able to quantify and systematically charac-
terize the content of central bank communications
makes it difﬁcult to benchmark the strength or impor-
tance of the communication, as well as its direction,
measured in terms of its monetary policy stance.
Moreover, we cannot easily measure what markets
had expected these communications to say, making it
hard to assess the strength or sign of any communica-
tion surprise. Because of these issues, we do not
attempt to qualitatively measure what is being said.
Rather, we simply test whether markets perceived
important new information in the communication,
which would be reflected in higher volatility in
market rates on communication dates relative to
non-communication dates. Another complication is
10.  Our sample begins with the ﬁrst release of the FAD schedule. We do not
include the data for the three months following the September 11, 2001, ter-
rorist attacks, owing to possible distortions in the data.
11.  In terms of the methodology used to measure the markets’ reaction to
Bank of Canada communications, we follow Reeves and Sawicki (2007).
that market participants could react to other events
that occur on the same day as the release of a Bank
communication, causing interest rates to change as a
result. To isolate the impact of Bank of Canada com-
munications on market rates, we run a two-stage
regression model in which we ﬁrst control for other
market-moving news, as described below. Thus,
(1)
In equation 1, we control for other news by regressing
the 1-day change in various key Canadian interest
rates ( ) on the surprise component of Canadian
policy announcements ( ), the surprise compo-
nent of U.S. policy announcements ( ), Federal
(Reserve) Open Market Committee (FOMC) commu-
nication control variables (  and ) and the
surprise component of macroeconomic announce-
ments in Canada and the United States (cmaci,t and
usmacj,t , respectively).12
Once we have controlled for these other events, we
relate the unexplained variance of our interest rates
(i.e., the squared residual of equation 1) to communi-
cations. We do this using the following regression
equation:
(2)
where  is the squared residual from equation 1 for
interest rate ,  represents the  type of
communication, which are modelled as dummy varia-
bles that take the value of 1 on days when there are
FAD press releases, MPR releases, or speeches (i.e.,
= 1, 2, or 3) and zero otherwise. We then compare
the variance of the market rates on communication
days against the average variance on all non-commu-
nication days, controlling for the gradual decline in
market volatility over our period of study by includ-
ing the VIX index ( ). 13
We run this set of equations for each of our key inter-
est rates. These include the 3-month Canadian dealer
12.  See the Appendix for more detail on these controls.
13.  The VIX index is a commonly used measure of overall global ﬁnancial
market volatility (often referred to as the “fear gauge”). It is based on the vol-
atility implied from a set of S&P 500 options contract prices.
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offered rate (CDOR), the 90-, 180-, and 270-day con-
stant maturity bankers’ acceptance future (BAX) rates
calculated from the front four BAX contracts; and 2-,
5-, and 10-year constant-maturity Government of Can-
ada benchmark bond yields calculated from the zero
coupon curve.14,15
Over the full sample (Table 1), we ﬁnd that FAD press
releases have a signiﬁcant impact on the volatility of
short- to medium-term market rates, suggesting that,
on average, these statements contain important “new”
information for the short- to medium-term outlook.
This is not surprising, since this statement contains
the policy-rate decision, the reasons behind the deci-
sion, an update of the Governing Council’s view of
the economic outlook, and, more recently, forward-
looking policy guidance and a discussion of the bal-
ance of the risks to the outlook.
An interesting result is that market rates do not react
significantly to the MPR, even though it is the main
method of communicating and updating the Bank’s
detailed views on the current state and likely evolution
of the economy (as illustrated by the statistically non-
significant coefficients in column 2, Table 1). This can be
explained by the fact that the MPR is published quite
soon after the FAD press release. Since the two are con-
sistent by design, the MPR may not contain much incre-
mental market news compared with the FAD press
release. Another interesting result is that speeches are
found to have a significant effect on some market rates.
Since speeches rarely deviate from the discussion pre-
sented in the published MPR, we did not expect mar-
kets to react significantly to speeches over our sample.
To test the robustness of this result, we ran a sensitivity
analysis and found that by removing only two
speeches—the two that drew the largest market reac-
tion—from our sample of 98, our results were no longer
significant at the 5 per cent level, thus suggesting that,
in general, speeches do not have a significant impact on
market rates over our sample.
To address the issue of whether the inclusion of for-
ward-looking statements has in fact enhanced the
Bank’s monetary policy transparency, we rerun these
14.  The 3-month CDOR is the rate to which the BAX futures contracts settle
and was found by Johnson (2003) to be a good measure of market expecta-
tions.
15.  Johnson (2003) shows empirically that the front three BAX contracts are
among the rates that are most representative of expectations in Canada
(under 1 year). Harvey (1996) shows that changes in futures prices tend to
respond more quickly than (or lead) other money market rates in their reac-
tion to economic news. For a fuller discussion of the BAX market, see Johnson
(2003) and Harvey (1996).
regressions over a split sample (split at 22 July 2004,
the point at which forward-looking statements began
being used consistently) and compare the results for
each of the shorter samples with those from our full
sample. We ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst subsample (October
2000–July 2004), a period when forward-looking state-
ments were used inconsistently and sparingly, the
FAD press releases and speeches are significant for var-
ious maturities of interest rates (consistent with our
full-sample results). In the second subsample, how-
ever, except for one interest rate, no communication
events are signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings seem to support
the idea that markets focus on the forward-looking
statement and view it as a rough pre-commitment
because, in contrast to our earlier results, FAD press
releases are no longer significant at the 5 per cent level.
However, it could also be that the reduced reaction to
FAD press releases is the result of a better or increased
understanding of the monetary policy reaction func-
tion of the Bank as markets became accustomed to the
new FAD regime. That is, there are fewer information
asymmetries between the central bank and markets
about the reaction function and therefore less new
Table 1
Impact of Bank of Canada Communications on
Market Volatility
Interest Fixed announce- Monetary Policy Speeches (g3)









dealer offered 0.772 5.944 0.261
rate (CDOR) (0.392) (0.289) (0.776)
90-day bankers’ 14.761 17.014 6.431
acceptance (BAX) (0.001) (0.295) (0.060)
180-day BAX 24.930 24.463 15.586
(0.004) (0.212) (0.021)
270-day BAX 26.570 23.963 16.241
(0.010) (0.234) (0.037)
2-year bond 14.975 14.333 5.236
(0.023) (0.249) (0.177)
5-year bond 5.146 4.547 2.121
(0.283) (0.519) (0.460)
10-year bond -0.251 -0.833 0.432
(0.934) (0.863) (0.844)
Note: Boldface indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level. The p-value is
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information in central bank communication. We
examine the latter possibility in the following analysis.
These ﬁndings suggest that markets
focus on the forward-looking statement
and view it as a rough pre-commitment.
For our second test, we modify equation 2 by incorpo-
rating a cross-dummy variable that takes the value of
1 on FADs when the FAD press release contained a
forward-looking statement, and zero otherwise. The
coefﬁcient on this cross dummy represents the change
in the markets’ reaction on FADs that include for-
ward-looking statements relative to all FAD press
statements. Thus,
(3)
where comm1,t takes the value of 1 on FADs and zero
otherwise, while  takes the value of 1 on those
FADs that include a forward-looking statement and
zero otherwise. We estimate equation 3 over the full
sample. The sum of the estimates for  and  repre-
sents the average reaction of the market to FADs (i.e.,
the average impact on the variance of interest rates on
those days) that include forward-looking statements,
while the estimate for alone represents the markets’
average reaction on FADs over the entire sample.  If
markets are ignoring information on the outlook con-
tained in the FAD press release outside of the forward-
looking statement itself, we would expect the coefﬁ-
cient on this additional cross-dummy variable ( ) to
be negative and signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd that coefﬁcients
on the cross dummies (in each key interest rate regres-
sion) are in general negative and signiﬁcant. This sup-
ports our hypothesis that the Bank of Canada has
become more predictable over the second half of our
sample (Table 2).
Finally, we test to see if there has been a decline in the
impact of macroeconomic news announcements on
changes in interest rates since the regular inclusion of
forward-looking statements in the FAD press release.
To do so, we create cross-dummy variables for macro-
economic news and add these variables to equation 1.
The new cross-dummy variables multiply the macro-
e
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economic news variables by a dummy that takes the
value of 1 over the period from 22 July 2004 to 31 May
2007, and zero otherwise. Equation 1 is modiﬁed
slightly to include these additional variables, as fol-
lows:
(4)
where Dumttakes the value of 1 during the period
from 22 July 2004 to 31 May 2007, and zero otherwise.
If markets understand the central bank’s reaction
function better (less well), Canadian macroeconomic
news cross-dummy tests should yield signiﬁcant posi-
tive (negative) coefﬁcients ( ) as market participants
react more (less) fully to new domestic economic
information as it arrives. We ﬁnd that for all key inter-
est rates, the majority (11 of 14) of the Canadian macro-
economic surprise cross dummies ( ) were negative,
suggesting that markets reacted less to Canadian mac-
roeconomic releases in the second half of our sample,
Table 2
Impact of Forward-Looking Statements in FAD
Press Releases
Interest FAD press release FAD press release




d0 d1Vixt gcomm1 t , bcomm1 t , *FLSt hit , + ++ + =
3-month Canadian
dealer offered 2.631 -3.875
rate (CDOR) (0.098) (0.021)
90-day bankers’ 22.098 -15.633
acceptance (BAX) (0.001) (0.060)
180-day BAX 41.124 -34.205
(0.003) (0.036)
270-day BAX 49.141 -46.766
(0.003) (0.016)
2-year bond 26.548 -23.285
(0.019) (0.070)
5-year bond 13.558 -16.551
(0.104) (0.078)
10-year bond 3.889 -7.979
(0.437) (0.180)
Note: Boldface indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level. The p-value is
shown in parentheses.
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thus lending further support to our increased-predict-
ability hypothesis.16
Conclusion
Our analysis provides some indication that the recent
inclusion of guidance on the policy rate may not yet
have yielded an improvement in market participants’
understanding of what key economic information
goes into the Bank of Canada’s interest rate decisions.
Indeed, our study suggests that forward-looking
statements—even though they have been designed to
be conditional—have made the Bank’s decisions on
the policy rate more predictable but have not neces-
sarily enhanced the markets’ understanding of the
Bank’s monetary policy reaction function.
As with any empirical study, however, there are some
important caveats. First, there are issues related to the
smaller sample size. By largely focusing on the second
half of the sample, we reduce the number of FAD
communications and in turn likely reduce the robust-
ness of our empirical methodology. There are also a
number of issues related to the different economic
environments between the ﬁrst and second half of the
full sample; for instance, there are only a few policy
turning points over our full sample and none in the
second half of the sample, the period when forward-
looking statements were consistently used. As such,
there is less uncertainty as well as fewer macroeco-
nomic shocks and news to react to, possibly contribut-
ing to some of our second-half results in which
macroeconomic variables become less important mov-
ers of interest rates. As well, empirical work suggests
that the pre-existing shape of the yield curve at the
time of the communication will affect how markets
react to news along the yield curve.
Another related caveat is that the sample period in
which the forward-looking statements were consist-
ently included in FAD press releases is one where
there has not been a sharp change in the Bank of Can-
ada’s view about the economic outlook for inﬂation.
Moreover, the Bank of Canada stressed in its commu-
nications during this period that it does not react to
any one macroeconomic shock or surprise. The
smaller reaction of market rates to macroeconomic
news in the second half of our sample may reﬂect, in
part, the market’s better understanding of how the
16. Several of these negative cross dummies were also signiﬁcant at the 5 per
cent level. As well, of the few cross dummies with positive coefﬁcients, none
was signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level.
Bank of Canada reacts to the accumulation of macro-
economic data. Consequently, instead of reacting sub-
stantially to one-off macroeconomic shocks, there is a
more gradual shift in policy-rate expectations from
market participants, who have an accumulation of
data that we are unable to control for in our methodol-
ogy.
Finally, using data at a daily frequency may also affect
our results because it is not possible to control for all
other shocks hitting the market on the same day. Fur-
ther study at an intraday trading frequency might
yield different answers.
That said, there is general agreement among central
bankers that issues relating to the incorporation of
conditionality and uncertainty around this form of
policy guidance remain. The debate focuses on the
weighting of the risks versus the beneﬁts of guidance
on the policy rate, and the various views on how con-
ditionality can be incorporated into the communica-
tions strategy. Consequently, a full spectrum of
communications strategies is employed in determin-
ing how much of the policy outlook to reveal. These
strategies range from not including policy guidance
except by being more explicit about how perspective
changes in key macroeconomic variables will affect
the balance of risks to the central bank’s outlook to
regularly publishing a forecast for the policy rate.
There may be no “ideal” communications strategy
that sufﬁciently mitigates the risk that markets per-
ceive a lack of conditionality and uncertainty sur-
rounding the published policy guidance.17,18 In
deciding to provide policy signals or guidance, how-
ever, it should be remembered that the goal is to
enhance markets’ understanding of the central bank’s
typical monetary policy reaction function, rather than
the more narrow aim of increasing markets’ ability to
predict future monetary policy actions. By adjusting
its communications strategy in this way, the central
bank will be better placed to achieve the desired
increase in monetary policy transparency that should
enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism.
17.  Walsh (2008) argues that there is a related distinction, between better and
more central bank information about its economic outlook, in which better
information is always found to be welfare improving while more has an
ambiguous effect on welfare.
18. Research by van der Cruijsen, Eijfﬁnger, and Hoogduin (2008) shows that
there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transpar-
ency beyond which markets might: i) start to attach too much weight to their
forecasts, or ii) become confused by the large and increasing amount of infor-
mation they receive.33 BANK OFCANADAREVIEW • WINTER 2008–2009
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Appendix: Description of Controls
We calculate the surprise component of macroeco-
nomic announcements using the following for-
mula:
, (1)
where  are the actual minus the market
expected value of the  macroeconomic release
on day , and is the sample standard deviation
of surprises for the  macroeconomic release.
This is set to zero on days where no macroeco-
nomic announcements are made.
Financial market expectations or forecasts of the
macroeconomic data release used in calculating the
surprise component are provided by Bloomberg
surveys conducted before each announcement. We
include in our study the subset of independent
macroeconomic surprise variables that were signif-
icant at the 5 per cent levels over our sample.
Among Canadian releases, this includes releases on
both the core and headline consumer price indexes,
and on employment and the gross domestic prod-
uct, housing starts, the Ivey purchasing managers
index, leading indicators, manufacturing ship-
ments, and retail sales. The U.S. macroeconomic
surprise variables that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant at the
5 per cent level include core consumer price inﬂa-
tion, gross domestic product, hourly earnings,
industrial production, the Institute for Supply
Management (ISM) index, non-farm payrolls, the
core and headline producer price indexes, the trade
balance, and the unemployment release.
Canadian policy surprises are calculated as the 1-
daychangeinthe1-monthbankers’acceptancerate
on Canadian monetary policy decision days. This is
set to zero on non-policy days.
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where  is the total number of days in the month,
is the day of the month of the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee (FOMC) decision, and is the
change in the futures rate on the day of the policy
decision (including inter-meeting actions). We set
this equal to zero on non-policy days.
To control for the impact of FOMC communica-
tions on Canadian rates, we will include the 1-day
change in the second eurodollar futures contract as
well as the 1-day change in the on-the-run 2-year
Treasury on dates of FOMC press releases, testimo-
nies, and minutes.
D
d
Dff1t